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This paper deals with incidence of housing subsidies. This property is analyzed using Fin-
nish panel data from biggest Finnish cities. The main data set includes 50 000 households 
that have received housing allowances for the period 2000-2008. Preliminary results suggest 
that a part of subsidies will indeed go rents. A conservative estimate of the size of shift is 15 
per cent but it is well possible that the number is even 25 per cent. On the other hand, the 
subsidy seems to have increased housing demand more than the subsidy-induced income 
effect would  
have implied which is in accordance with the goals of the subsidy program. Our results seem 
to be consistent with other research results that have also ended up with relative high rent 
effects. If this is indeed the case, it is well founded to reconsider the need for reforming the 
system of housing subsidies at least with respect to the share of costs that remains on house-
holds’ own account. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper deals with the incidence problem of government income transfers. The 
problem of incidence is very common in taxation but obviously it is also relevant for 
government transfers and subsidies. It becomes apparent when one tries to answer to 
the question of who in the very end is going to pay the tax or receive the transfer. 
The idea is that the burden of taxes (similarly, the benefit from transfers and subsi-
dies) may shift from the original agent to the market counterpart even though the 
original agent has the legal obligation to pay the tax (or receive the subsidy) and take 
care of the proceedings of the payment or the receipt. The issue becomes quite com-
plicated when we consider it in a general equilibrium setting which is illustrated in 
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Figure 1. Housing allowance does not only affect income of the poor but also in-
come of the landlords, rents, tax rates, labour supply, housing production and so on. 
Because the pros and cons of housing allowance are so complicated, housing allow-
ance represents also a typical public choice problem. Here, we ignore these elements 
and focus on the incidence question only.  
In the case of taxation, we know the basic results of incidence pretty well. 
Very shortly, all depends on supply and demand elasticities of the respective aggre-
gate supply and demand curves when we face perfect competition. In the case of 




As for income transfers or subsidies, we know a lot less. The reason is that na-
tional systems are very different and institutions play a more important role (cf. e.g. 
the MISSOC Data base of European Union which gives an overview of national so-
cial security systems and Ditch et al. (2001) for a comparison of housing allowance 
systems).  
Housing assistance in Finland is quite extensive. Currently it includes 160 000 
households (out of 2450 000 households) and the expenditures come close to 500 
Mil. Euros (which is roughly 0.3 per cent of GDP).
3
 Housing assistance is also re-
lated to social assistance which is distributed using the Housing assistance rules. 
Within social assistance all housing expenditures (which qualify these rules) are paid 
to poor households that have no or very little income.  
The effects of housing assistance are analyzed in relatively numerous studies 
due to the fact that in a form or another it is used in most countries. A useful survey 
is provided by Rosen (1985). Evidence from more recent policy experiments is pro-
vided by Gibbons and Manning (2003) using the UK data. Gibbons and Manning 
arrive at the result that even 50 % of assistance shifts to rents. An even higher esti-
mate is obtained by Fack (2006) who found the representative number for the French 
housing assistance reform was as high as 78 %. In the United States, Susin (2002) 
estimated the rent effects of housing vouchers and found the effect to be about 16 
per cent. In Finland, there as two studies by Kangasharju (2003 and 2008) which 
have produced quite different results. The first one arrived at an estimate of 15 per 
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 In Finland, relative few studies of (tax) incidence have been carried out. See, however, 
Viren (2009) for VAT taxes and Korkeamäki and Uusitalo (2006) for employers’ social se-
curity expenses.  
 
3
 The Finnish housing allowance follows the rule: allowance = 0,8*(min(max_expenses, 
rent) – base deduction), where base deduction depends on income and household characteris-
tics. For instance, in the case of single person household base deduction is  0, when 0 < in-
come < 541, base deduction = 298 when income is 1245 and when income exceeds 1245, no 
allowance is granted. The maximum allowance  (max_expenses) depends on the regulated 
norm space and rent levels. The latter depends on the location of the municipality and the age 
of the house.    
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cent while the latter got a much higher value (60-70 per cent). Both studies used sin-
gle changes in the assistance parameters in the differences in differences framework 
where receivers of the housing assistance were controlled.
4
 Finally a study and Hi-
ekka and Viren (2008) ought to be mentioned. Basically, it used similar data as the 
current study but the sample for limited to 1000 households in the Turku city area. 
The study arrived at the tentative results that one fourth of housing allowance shifts 
to rents.  
This study mainly uses panel data for Finnish households who have received 
housing assistance (sometimes) during the period 2000-2008. Altogether 50 000 
households are included in the data. Basically, 9 major changes in the housing assis-
tance are considered during the period but because different households have differ-
ent possibilities of getting housing assistance (due to income, location and so on) we 
have also quite a lot of cross-section heterogeneity in statutory housing assistance 
levels which altogether provide much more variability in both the rents levels and 
(exogenous) housing assistance.  
2. Background for empirical analyses 
To find out the magnitude of incidence problem we consider the conventional sup-
ply-demand framework. In the first place, we assume that the demand for rented 
houses takes the following from:  
 
Q = D(Y/P, A/P, N, PH/P)      (1) 
 
Where  Q denotes the demand for housing services (space, quality, location and so 
on), Y income (excluding housing allowance), A housing allowance,  N the size of 
the household, PH the rent level  and  P the general price level. The supply of rental 
housing is, in turn, determined by the following function:  
 
Q = S(PH/MC),       (2) 
 
where MC denotes the relevant marginal cost of the rental housing.  
To measure these costs we use house prices (in fact, the regional indexes of 
house prices). Basically, we should use some sort of user of housing which after all 
is relatively easily constructed. This time, we however, use this simpler proxy.  
By setting (1) and (2) equal, we may solve the system in terms of PH which 
takes the following form:   
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 The properties of the differences in differences (DD) approach are surveyed in e.g. Ber-




PH = PH(Y/P, A/P, N, MC/P)     (3) 
 
In practice, this is estimated in a (log) linearized from. The coefficients obviously 
reflect the demand and supply elasticities which determine the incidence values in a 
way explained by e.g. Susin (2002). Needless to say, if supply is completely inelas-
tic and demand perfectly elastic housing allowance shifts completely to rents (and 
thus goes to landlords). By contrast, if the supply side functions well in a sense be-
ing very price elastic (and competitive, of course) housing allowance would just in-
crease the tenants’ income and show up increase demand for housing.  Intuitively, 
one might expect some sort of 50 – 50 outcome although the only way to find out 
the truth is to estimate (3) scrutinize the parameter values of Max 
 In what follows, equation (3) is estimated in the form:  
 
(pH/p)it = a0i + a1(MC/p)t + a2N t + a3Space t + a4Age t + a5(Y/p) t + a6Max t + uit,      (4) 
 
Where pH denotes the rent level, p the (Consumer Price Index) CPI, MC the 
house price index,  N  the size of household (number of people), Space the size of 
flat,  Age the age of the flat, Y income (prior to housing allowance) and Max to the 
maximum achievable housing allowance. uit is the random term where i denotes the 
i:th household and t the period (year).  
The model is estimated using the fixed effects model as the basic specification 
although we scrutinize all versions fixed effects models, that is: no fixed effects, 
cross-section fixed effects, and both cross-section and time fixed effects).  
The essential feature in the analysis is that the key variable Max does not di-
rectly depend on the actual rent level. It only measures the potential maximum 
achievable allowance that can be received for the flat in question (given the age of 
the flat and the location of flat). Obviously, the choice of the flat (in addition to the 
tenure choice) is endogenous which makes the Max variable to some extent endoge-
nous as well. But it is hard to take the consequences of this choice problem into ac-
count.
5
Obviously there is some simultaneity link between rents, allowances and 
house prices as well due to capitalization of rents. For the time being, we ignore this 
problem.  
Before we turn to estimation results some comments on data merit note.  
 The main data source is the Finnish National Pension Fund (FNPF) that dis-
tributes the housing allowance. The data sample that the FNPF has kindly provided 
to us is based on register data which are based on housing allowance applications 
which turn are based on actual lease agreement contracts. Thus, the data are pretty 
accurate compared e.g. to various survey measures.  
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 The results of Lyytikäinen (2006) suggest that these simultaneity problems are not particu-
larly severe in the Finnish data).  
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The FNPF data cover 9 years (2000-2008) and include 50 000 households 
from 345 municipalities. Most of them come from biggest cities, thus about one half 
come from the Helsinki metropolitan area. Potentially, the number of observations is 
450 000 but in practice it is much less because the there are no data for the periods 
in which housing allowance is not paid. The effective number of observations (after 
taking account all missing observations) is hence ”only” 140 000. Although the data 
are good there is one problem with data: the data include only households that have 
received housing allowance. Thus, in the data we have no proper control group. In 
many cases the same households have received housing allowance during the whole 
sample period so that it is also a bit difficult to distinguish ”new” rent level and ”ex-
isting rent levels”. Fortunately the data are large enough to facilitate comparison of 
new and existing (old) contracts.  
The Finnish Income Distribution Data (FIDD) is much smaller (the number of 
observations is only about 26 500 consisting of 10 500 households) although the 
number of variables is much larger (760) because the data include all possible vari-
ables for income, taxation, income transfers and related items. The data are partly in 
a panel form but here we have just used the newest cross-section to see whether it 
makes any difference if we focus on households that receive housing allowance and 
households which do not receive housing allowance. Thus, basically we try test the 
”law of one price” in the Finnish rental markets.  In addition, we use these data re-
visit the demand equation for rents housing.  
Some idea of the Finnish system can be obtained from the enclosed graphs. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the mean values of rents and the Max variable, Figures 4 
illustrates the relationship between rental price and the demand for rental housing 
and finally, Figure 5 gives some idea of the presentence of rents (showing the annual 
frequency of changes in rents) 
3. Interpretation of results  
The estimation results are presented in Tables 1-3. Table 1 deals with the rent level 
equation (4) which is estimated from the Finnish panel data. From the same data, we 
have estimated also a demand equation for rental housing. Finally, we estimated a 
rent and rental housing demand equations from the 2007 cross-section data of the 
Finnish income distribution survey.  
The demand equation is quite simple (double log) model of the following 
form:  
 
Spaceit = b0i + b1(pH/p)it + b2N t + b3(A/P) t + b4Age t + b5(Y/p) t + b6Spaceit-1 + uit,   (5) 
 
where Space denotes the quantity of the housing that is in practice measured by the 




Before considering the estimates it is worthwhile to consider the dynamics of 
rents that is illustrated in Figure 5. Quite clearly, a considerable proportion of rents 
is not changed every year. The rents which have been decreased are also in most 
cases “constant rents”: reductions are usually very small (something like rounding 
errors).  
As for the result in table, we see that they are relatively robust in terms of 
panel data estimation procedure and variable transformations (level vs. log). The 
estimates of the shift parameter are all highly significant suggesting that the value of 
elasticity parameter is somewhat between 0.2 and 0.4 so that a very conservative 
estimate is just 0.2. Rents increase along with the price of houses and household in-
come. By contrast, the age of house has a negative impact. Real rents also decrease 
if the tenant remains in the same flat for longer time. To some surprise, the role of 
the household size remains somewhat ambiguous. This is probably due to the fact 
that the MAX variable already includes the impact of the household size (a bigger 
family gets automatically a bigger household allowance). 
The demand curve (5) estimates in table 2 are also easy to interpret: higher in-
come increase demand and higher price lowers it. In the same way, larger household 
size has a positive effect. The role of housing allowance seems clear: it has a posi-
tive effect on the size of the flat and the effect seems to be larger than the effect of 
wage (other) income.  This could, of course, reflect simultaneity between the size of 
the apartment and the housing allowance but even though we use just an allowance 
dummy or lagged allowance we get (ceteris paribus) a positive effect.  
We also scrutinize the demand behaviour using the Income Distribution Data-
base cross-section data for 2007 (Table 3). The data allows testing the importance of 
housing allowance in the case where only a part of households receives housing al-
lowance. Quite clearly, rents are related to housing allowance, the coefficient of this 
variable is much higher the coefficient of wage income or other income transfers. 
The result is in fact well in accordance with the basic aim of the housing allowance, 
that is, an improvement of the housing conditions of the poor.  
The cross-section data quite clearly suggests that the price of one law holds in 
the sense that rents (per squares meters) for housing allowance receivers and non-
receivers are the same (see e.g. column 2 in Table 3). Actual (total) rents do indeed 
differ but this probably due to the fact that those who receive housing allowance 
live, ceteris paribus, in larger apartments. 
4. Concluding remarks 
It is all clear that a part of housing allowance shifts to prices. The questions only of 
the magnitude of the tax shift. In this study, a conservative estimate is 0.2. Thus one 
fifth of an increase in housing allowance shifts to market rents. That is, the rents of 
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all households in rental housing do increase. It is also well possible that the true 
number is larger than 0.2.  
One has to keep in mind that the whole story does not end here. Housing al-
lowances (in Finland, at least) are in practice indexed to market rents so that the al-
lowances are adjusted annually according to developments in rental markets during 




It has to be kept in mind that the increase in rents hurt those who are not eligi-
ble to housing allowance, basically the middle income households. Their real in-
come will decrease and their housing demand will decrease even more. The situation 
is deteriorated still more because they have to pay additional taxes to finance the 
housing allowance. Thus, in all, housing allowance leads to larges changes in in-
come distribution and so cannot even be sure that at the limit the Pigou & Dalton 
principle holds. Moreover, strongly income related housing allowance leads to pov-
erty traps because the effective tax rates at least some households goes to 100 per 
cent. This, in turn, leads to adverse effects on labour supply which are not, of course, 
good thing thinking about the functioning of the labour market and the rate of infla-
tion.  
Therefore, we should very carefully scrutinize the general equilibrium effects 
of housing allowance and in particular consider possibilities of reducing the eventual 
shift of allowance to markets rents and (de facto) indexation of housing allowances.  
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 Assume e.g. that we have a system where the rent = α (= exogenous factors) + 
0.2*allowance and allowance is indexed as: allowance = rent(-1) –  β (=some constant) we 
will arrive at the long run solution of the form: rent = (α-.2*β)/.8. So the long-run shift factor 
is 0.25 instead of 0.20. If the estimate of Max were 0.5 the long-run shift factor would in fact 
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Figure 4.  Scatter plot between the apartment size and the rent level 
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 0.935  0.952  0.956  0.952  0.956  0.895  
DW  1.28  1.48  1.49  1.45  1.46  1.47  




Source: own creation 
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(50.20) 
 


































































Panel  No FE  No FE  Period 
FE  
No FE  Local  No FE Local 
R
2 
 0.704  0.716  0.723  0.905  0.906  0.684 0.901 
DW  0.37  0.32  0.33  1.56  1.54  0.27 1.58 
Source: own creation 
*) Lagged value of assistance/ p is used instead of the current value. The dependent variable 
is the size of the apartment. Otherwise, notation is the same as in Table 1 
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 0.242  0.240  0.398  0.566  0.577  0.616  
SEE  2.914  2.918  155.0  17.30  17.19  0.273  
Source: own creation 
Y denotes here household gross income, W wage income and Tr income transfers. Other-
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